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Causality in psychiatry: a Hybrid 
symptom network Construct Model
Gerald Young*
York University, Toronto, ON, Canada
Causality or etiology in psychiatry is marked by standard biomedical, reductionistic
models (symptoms reflect the construct involved) that inform approaches to nosology, 
or classification, such as in the DSM-5 [Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, Fifth Edition; (1)]. However, network approaches to symptom interaction [i.e., 
symptoms are formative of the construct; e.g., (2), for posttraumatic stress disorder
(PTSD)] are being developed that speak to bottom-up processes in mental disorder, in 
contrast to the typical top-down psychological construct approach. The present article 
presents a hybrid top-down, bottom-up model of the relationship between symptoms 
and mental disorder, viewing symptom expression and their causal complex as a recip-
rocally dynamic system with multiple levels, from lower-order symptoms in interaction to 
higher-order constructs affecting them. The hybrid model hinges on good understanding 
of systems theory in which it is embedded, so that the article reviews in depth non-linear 
dynamical systems theory (NLDST). The article applies the concept of emergent circular 
causality (3) to symptom development, as well. Conclusions consider that symptoms 
vary over several dimensions, including: subjectivity; objectivity; conscious motivation 
effort; and unconscious influences, and the degree to which individual (e.g., meaning) 
and universal (e.g., causal) processes are involved. The opposition between science and 
skepticism is a complex one that the article addresses in final comments.
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CaUsaLity in psyCHiatry: a HyBrid syMptoM netWorK 
ConstrUCt ModeL
The article tackles fundamental issues in psychiatry while proposing novel solutions. In particular, it 
considers the relationship between symptoms and disorder by examining extant models and current 
research. It attempts to disambiguate some of the confusions related to understanding and research-
ing the models, preparing the way for presentation of a genuinely hybrid one based on systems 
theory thinking. Moreover, it presents other novel concepts related to emergent causality, and the 
relationship of meaning and causality in symptoms (hermeneutic insight and causal explanation; 
Verstehen, Erklären, respectively). The article presents a complex view of the relationship between 
meaning and causality involving three dimensions.
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introdUCtion
opposing Models
The article reflects on two types of models, a latent variable model 
(or construct model), which is seen as a top-down approach to 
understanding the relationship between symptoms and disorders, 
and a symptom interaction model (or network model), which is 
seen as a bottom-up approach to understanding the relationship 
between symptoms and disorders. In latent variable modeling, an 
underlying construct (e.g., depression) is considered causal of the 
relationship of the items or behaviors (e.g., symptoms) that are 
subsumed by the variable. In an item or behavior interaction or 
networked model (e.g., symptoms), relatively few direct relations 
are considered causal of the item/behavior/symptom relation-
ships, which are deemed to lie among the latter themselves.
In the first model of the two involved, which is the traditional 
approach, symptoms (items) reflect a common underlying 
psychological construct and, therefore, this type of model is 
considered “reflective” (4). In this construct model, the cause of 
the mental symptom/disorder derives from the central construct, 
whether a disorder or a cluster, downward to the symptoms. In 
the symptom-interactive model, symptoms (items) mutually 
affect each other, and can be represented by a composite variable, 
but the direction of the causality is from the symptom interac-
tions to the composite. The model is referred to as “formative” (4).
In this network model, which is the second of the two involved, 
causality springs from the symptoms (or clusters) interacting 
among themselves, a process that acts to change the symptoms/
clusters (or initiate them). The composite variable is involved only 
as representation.
Before describing the hybrid model in depth, some of the 
challenges in doing so are described. This leads to presentation 
of a literature review preparatory to it.
systems
The article will consider the following crucial questions. First, 
what do we miss when we represent disorders solely with top-
down models such as the construct model? What do we miss 
when we represent disorders solely with bottom-up models 
such as a network model? In order to answer these questions, 
the hybrid model that has been created is framed in Non-Linear 
Dynamical Systems Theory (NLDST), which can be viewed both 
as a model that is an umbrella one or superordinate one to the 
construct and network ones. Therefore, the article presents a 
novel hybrid model, which combines these two types of models 
(top-down, bottom-up) into a framework that both respects them 
yet adds to them without detracting from them.
In this work, researchers might obtain a covariance matrix 
related to the multiple symptoms in a study (referring to the 
covariance among scores of participants with respect to the 
symptoms that were measured). Once the matrix is established, 
the covariance obtained could be explained from either a com-
mon construct perspective or from that of symptom network 
interactions (i.e., common cause vs. direct causal relations). In 
this regard, the researcher evaluates either (a) the shared variance 
of all measured variables of a putative construct, e.g., estimating 
factor loadings, and the causal pattern is from the construct to the 
variables; or (b) the parameters for the direct relations between 
symptoms. Furthermore, in one type of hybrid approach, the 
variance that is not explained by the common construct might be 
explained residually through direct relations between networked 
symptoms.
That being said, the present hybrid model is not built on sta-
tistical synergies but conceptual ones. It presents a theoretically 
plausible causal model and the statistical task, then becomes to 
fit extant statistical approaches to the model or expand them for 
this purpose. The conceptual hybrid model is built on NLDST, 
and the multilevel hierarchical structure that it includes allows for 
upper levels of the system to work with lower levels in establishing 
the system whole. That is, if we equate psychological constructs 
with emergent higher-order system levels that might derive from 
lower-order levels and their bottom-up interactions, such as in 
networks, then the stage is set for having higher-order levels 
reciprocally influence in turn in a top-down fashion the networks 
involved. For example, depression might not only be constructed 
by its symptoms but also it might exist as a subjective mental con-
tent or disorder and influence the configuration of its symptoms 
(in context, and for the individual in her/his uniqueness).
If one excludes psychological constructs from consideration 
as a higher-order level in a systems model, the hybrid model 
as presented will be dismissed. However, if one allows for its 
inclusion in a systems framework, as described, the framework 
can readily be conceived as one that has emergent higher-order 
levels (or constructs, e.g., mental content and disorder) that can 
interact top-down and reciprocally with symptom networks in 
their bottom-up influence on the system.
Clusters
Another complication in developing a hybrid model involving 
construct and network approaches to symptom–disorder rela-
tionships involves clusters, which stand intermediate between 
symptoms and disorders. In network modeling, subsets (clusters) 
of items, behaviors, or symptoms (variables) might be found, but 
they are not considered as independent sources of causation rela-
tive to the direct relationships among the variables. Rather, vari-
ables within any one cluster might causally influence each other 
in their network. Inter-variable correlations will result, but they 
would not reflect the causal influence of a common underpinning 
construct. The article will deal with this issue as it proceeds in 
creating a genuine hybrid model.
On the one hand, the DSM-5 [Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition; (1)] includes many 
disorders that, through its polythetic approach to symptom 
identification, involve symptom clusters. However, the research 
on how many clusters are needed in the DSM’s disorders stands 
as an ongoing enterprise. For example, in posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD), the empirical findings on how to group its 
symptoms keeps finding an increasing amount of clusters. The 
number of factors or dimensions involved in research on PTSD 
has moved it from the DSM-5’s four-dimensional model to ones 
with even seven and eight dimensions (see below). On the other 
hand, in systems modeling, there is no reason why intermediate 
levels cannot constitute both top-down causal levels working on 
lower ones and levels that can be influenced by those lower ones, 
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while having levels superordinate to them influence them, while 
they form networks among themselves that can influence their 
superordinate levels. Therefore, systems modeling can accom-
modate the concept of clusters in symptoms.
The final prefatory note about the present hybrid model of 
symptom–mental disorder relations (with its mutual bottom-
up and top-down influences) is that its hybrid nature is not 
synonymous with an attempt to explain everything related to 
the question to the point that its inclusivity can really explain 
nothing. In this regard, there are many multifactorial models in 
causal explanation that are acceptable; there are many systems 
models in this regard; and there are many advancing conceptual 
and statistical notions that are hybrid and explanatory without 
being obtuse and untestable [e.g., Ref. (5, 6)].
issUes
In the following, the first substantive section of the article consid-
ers relevant concepts and terms. This lays the foundation for the 
literature review, model building, and applications.
Concepts
Psychiatry has been criticized at multiple levels, including its 
difficulties with its diagnostic manuals and their assumptions. It 
embraces mostly the medical model of disorder and diagnosis, 
the biocentric model of the causality of disorder, or etiology, and 
the psychopharmacological model of disorder treatment and 
management (6–9). Even the basic concept of what constitutes 
a mental disorder has been disputed. In the following, I review 
aspects of these issues, preparing the way for presentation of my 
own work in the area. The section ends with an integrated view 
of what is mental disorder.
The RDoC project [Research Domain of Criteria; (10, 11)] 
contends that it offers a broad approach to causation in psychia-
try, but its critics maintain that it is especially biomedical, neu-
rocentric, and reductionistic [e.g., Ref. (6, 12, 13)]. Similarly, the 
DSM-5 is a psychiatric classificatory system that aims to include 
reliable and valid categories of mental disorder with clear causes 
(etiology), an aspiration that, if realized, would facilitate effective 
treatment; however, its critics maintain that it fails to achieve its 
objective [e.g., Ref. (6–9)]. Also, in terms of causal explanations, 
they maintain that it is still steeped in the biocentric model.
Multifactorial causal models in psychiatry have been for-
mulated, such as the biopsychosocial model [e.g., Ref. (5, 6)]. 
Moreover, newer modeling efforts are specifying the mechanisms 
in the interactions among causal influences on behavior and its 
disturbance, such as work on networks [e.g., Ref. (2, 14)] and 
attractor dynamics [e.g., Ref. (15)].
To highlight in more depth the main argument of the article, 
bottom-up causality in psychiatry refers to the interaction and 
mutual influence of symptoms in mental illness, while top-
down ones refer to the influence of underlying latent variables 
or constructs on symptom expression. A genuinely interactive 
bottom-up, top-down model would acknowledge both the real-
ity of an underlying latent variable or construct in influencing 
symptomatology and also networked symptom connections as 
influencing the underlying construct.
This approach might be antithetical to those who hold either 
a network or construct view of system–disorder relations, but 
there are advantages to the model. Moreover, it fits the overarch-
ing model of systems theory. In this regard, the next section 
of the article explains in depth the concept of systems, which 
includes different levels, self-organization, emergence, and 
attractors.
non-Linear dynamical systems theory
This section of the article reviews some critical concepts in 
NLDST. Detailed presentation of systems theory is beyond the 
scope of the present work; the reader should consult Thelen and 
Smith (16); Young (3), and also Bielczyk et al. (15).
NLDST is distinguished by its emphasis on self-organized 
emergence in system component interactions within and across 
levels. In particular, higher-order levels of systems might emerge 
through bottom-up interactive processes. For example, Vallacher 
et  al. (17) referred to the emergence of “global properties” or 
“coherent higher-order” states through the adjustment to each 
other of the individual system elements involved in a bottom to 
top (bottom-up, instead of top-down) self-organizational pro-
cess. Typically, self-organization does not reach the new system 
end-state instantaneously. Rather, there are many ongoing mutual 
system element adjustments that take place.
Through its concepts of emergence and self-organization, 
NLDST allows for explanation of how higher-order patterns in 
behavior, from the simplest limb movements to the most pro-
found thoughts, are part of the species’ repertoire. New systems 
states that emerge in a system function to constrain behavior 
emanating from the system. New state system input transforms 
toward state characteristics even if they are discrepant with them. 
That is, systems maintain stability once formed, even if perturbed, 
until further mutual element and input interactions lead to criti-
cal state transition points.
System states might change over time, but when they consist-
ently return to the same state after perturbation, the state involved 
is considered an attractor. Attractors reside in landscapes with 
basins; and the wider are the basins, the more likely a range of 
states in the system will converge on one attractor, which meta-
phorically could be considered to reside at the bottom of the basin 
involved. In this model, the “deeper” is the basin, the greater is the 
attractor’s resistance to perturbation.
When a system has two or more states, it is considered multi-
stable. The attractors could involve negative or undesirable states, 
such as having in the same person antagonism in conjunction with 
antagonism avoidance. Or, the two members of a couple could be 
living antagonistic regimes [e.g., Ref. (18)]. Beyond attractors on 
which system dynamics converge, an attractive force could be 
like a “repellor,” or one that scrupulously avoids regions in its 
state space rather than returning to it. Metaphorically, instead 
of in a basin, a repellor resides on top of a hill in the system’s 
landscape.
Systems might have no attractors, and therefore be more 
susceptible to external influences. Or, systems might have one 
attractor, sustain a perturbation that is critical (19), and produce 
self (re)organization through the effect on set points in control 
parameters in the system.
November 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1644
Young Causality in Psychiatry
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org
Finally for Vallacher et  al. (17), dynamic properties can be 
found at “different levels of psychological reality,” and dynamic 
transformations can take place at different time scales (seconds, 
years). Also, network concepts fall under the rubric of dynamic 
ones. That is, network nodes represent elements in systems. 
This notion is important for present purposes in that it justifies 
considering network models as part of larger ones in NLDST that 
includes higher-order levels that can be represented as constructs.
Samuelson et al. (20) emphasized the relevance of emergence 
in NLDST. Emergence takes place through systems components 
that interact and mutually influence each other in a soft-assembly 
process, or from the ground, rather than from pre-specified cen-
tral, top-down (deterministic) explicit coding or organization. It 
takes place over multiple time scales; can happen on the moment; 
and is conditioned by context and the history of the organism, so 
that the outcome is unique and variable. Systems might also have 
subsystems, which are strongly coupled or integrated compo-
nents that are only weakly coupled at best to other components. 
The authors give the example of seeking hidden objects in a first 
location even after viewing its hiding in a second one. Research 
shows that, in infants, the error involved (A-not-B) is a product 
of cognitive and motor components in interaction, with temporal 
and neural dynamics at work, too.
Hayes et al. (21) noted that dynamic systems concern pattern 
formation and change. The principles in dynamic systems science 
cut across biology, ecology, political science, and other disciplines, 
including physics and chemistry. Systems are adaptive when they 
maintain a dynamic tension between stability and variability. 
Although resilience to perturbation can be beneficial, it should 
not be overly rigid. For example, from a network perspective, in 
depression, negative emotions exhibit stronger temporal con-
nections (22). Psychotherapy can help in shifting maladaptive 
connections to adaptive ones, as demonstrated in the research of 
Hayes and colleagues and Schiepek et al. (23).
NLDST is a mathematical model that is conducive to psycho-
logical theorizing. For example, attractors can be represented by 
mathematical formalisms, and state spaces or trajectories in a sys-
tem can be represented by graphical representation of differential 
equations (24). In this regard, modeling could include approaches 
such as dynamic factor analysis and application of ergodic theory 
(25). Butner et al. (24) explained that, mathematically, Lyapunov 
exponents represent the strength of system topological features, 
for example, the rate a system changes toward or away from a 
particular state (the basin steepness). They can be calculated 
locally (e.g., at a set point) or globally (for the whole system).
Rabinovich et  al. (26) described dynamic transformation 
as allowing cognition and mind to emerge from brain and 
computation. Cognition is not reflected in any one brain center 
or even in the entire brain, but is a product of interconnected 
cooperativity over many elements. The spatiotemporal patterns 
in brain dynamics that are highly coherent could be called 
modes, and they reflect the play of extinction and stabilizing 
inhibition. Brain center clusters that form in tasks represent 
dynamical modes and correspond to transient system states. 
Superordinate levels in systems can be conceived as hierar-
chically arranged chunking networks, e.g., from sentences to 
paragraphs to chapters in texts.
Wichers et  al. (27) indicated how moment-to-moment 
affect dynamics can be viewed from NLDST. They referred 
to research showing that symptom networks in (severe) psy-
chopathology are more strongly interconnected than those of 
people with less severe psychopathology [e.g., Ref. (14)]. The 
networks exhibit vicious circles because their nodes reinforce 
each other. In dynamical terms, a system could be “very” 
stable and therefore even “strong” perturbations might not 
create variability, let alone a small one allowing for “critical 
transition” to another state at a “tipping point.” However, in 
psychopathology, if there is high, mutually reinforcing con-
nectivity with networks, such that vicious circles develop in 
the background without being noticed, the mood system could 
become fragile and vulnerable to transition, even when one 
node (affective state) is triggered for the reason that others 
are also activated in the network. A cascade effect results that 
continues to resonate in the network such that the “little” per-
turbation of the one node involved leads to a disproportionate 
mood change or critical transition (as in the well-known but-
terfly effect).
Mental disorder and symptoms
Before continuing in the article with the literature review and 
detailed modeling, the concept of a symptom needs clarification. 
This is undertaken toward better understanding mental disorder, 
which is also discussed in this section.
Symptom
A symptom is defied as a physical or mental feature that is a 
departure from a typical state or feeling and that might be indica-
tive of a disease, disturbance, disorder, unusual state, or condition 
(and which might be noticed by the patient). Symptoms might 
be subjectively experienced and phenomenologically reported or 
objectively obtained (signs, e.g., in laboratory tests). Symptoms 
include the contents of mental states that might recursively influ-
ence other symptoms, such as through the vicious circles that take 
place after catastrophic thinking and fears. Beliefs are powerful 
engines driving symptomatology, as are moods, affect, emotions, 
drives, desires, and motivation.
Much of the work in psychotherapy relates to these mental 
contents, the narratives people tell about themselves and to oth-
ers, and the meanings ascribed to events, as well as one’s past 
experiences, and one’s place in the present and future, in addition 
to other people’s actions and reactions to the person and their 
relationships with the person. In this sense, the person is as much, 
if not more, a seat of the causality of symptomatology experienced 
as are biological (nature) and environmental (nurture) factors 
(as per the biopsychosocial/biopersonalsocial models mentioned 
previously). That being said, not all symptoms can be taken at face 
value or are even genuine. This is especially true because of the 
influence of unconscious processes on symptom expression, as 
well as even conscious ones, such as those related to feigning or 
malingering for monetary gain, as might happen with PTSD, the 
exemplar chosen in the article. This difference between patient 
presentation and actual symptomatology constitutes the quan-
dary confronting clinicians, as well as the challenge that they and 
their patients must work through.
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Mental Disorder
As for defining mental disorder, there is no one accepted defini-
tion. The approach of the DSM-5 involves a clinically significant 
disturbance reflecting dysfunction usually associated with distress 
or disability in activity. In contrast, for the DSM, normally neither 
an expected, culturally approved loss to a common stressor/loss 
nor individual-society conflicts, involving socially deviant behav-
ior, are representative of mental disorder.
The DSM-5’s definition of mental disorder includes an error 
in reasoning (8). It indicates tautologically that a mental disorder 
is caused by a disturbance in mental functioning, which simply 
uses the same words on both sides of the definitional equation. 
The World Health Organization (28) definition of mental disor-
der does not help resolve the matter. It refers to a disorder as a 
combination of thoughts, perceptions, emotions, behavior, and 
relationships that are “abnormal.”
Closer inspection of the DSM-5 definition of mental disorder 
indicates that it is constituted by different levels. The DSM-5 
definition has implicit in it several levels. They include mental 
function atop the hierarchy, then mental disorder as one branch. 
The collection of signs (objective) and symptoms (subjective) 
happen behaviorally, emotionally (in regulation) and cognitively, 
and together constitute a syndrome. Furthermore, the ensemble 
of signs and symptoms are associated with a “clinically” signifi-
cant disturbance and usually a “significant distress, or disability.” 
Finally, at another level implicating causality, there are “dysfunc-
tions” in psychological, biological, or developmental “processes.” 
Aside from these levels, often, mental disorder in the DSM-5 
includes clusters of symptoms intermediate between the disorder 
and symptom list.
Both the DSM-5 definition of mental disorder and the WHO’s 
definition do not include directly environment, support or its 
lack, or context. A relational and systemic approach to mental 
disorder might better arrive at its acceptable and inclusive defini-
tion [e.g., Ref. (8)].
Young (6) developed a more elaborative definition of mental 
disorder. According to him, it involves “a behavioral syndrome 
(or pattern or network of symptoms) in context that is character-
ized as a clinically significant disturbance, distress, or dysfunction 
potentially evaluated as harmful to the individual, to others, or 
to both.” To establish clinical significance, well-informed (and 
trained) individuals should rely on reliable and relevant evidence. 
The mental disorder can be expressed in cognition, mood, rela-
tions, interactions, self-regulation, and other behavior and its 
organization. Biological, social, and personal (i.e., psychologi-
cal), as well as developmental processes, might be factors. Social, 
occupational, or other important functional activities might be 
involved in impairment, and they might meet disability thresh-
olds. The definition of mental disorder that I have provided is 
based on the DSM’s approach, but broadens it, for example, by 
mentioning symptom networks, which is important in the pre-
sent context.
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, Fifth Edition
According to Vanheule (9), a diagnostic category needs to be both 
reliable and valid. For reliability, he noted that the range of kappa 
results in reliability studies of DSM categories has shifted in the 
qualitative attribute given to the best results, the next best, and 
so on. In particular, Clarke et al. (29) used a shift in describing 
kappa results that seemingly allowed for acceptable reliability 
for quite a few DSM-5 categories in the DSM-5 field trials, when 
use of the kappa ranges used in research on prior versions of the 
DSM would have shown questionable reliability for those DSM-5 
results had the prior adjectives in summarizing kappa results had 
been applied without change. That being said, I note that the best 
results were obtained for PTSD (along with a few others; PTSD 
reliability results for the DSM-5 were considered at least fair or 
very good, depending on the criteria).
As for validity, Vanheule (9) queried whether the DSM-5 
accounts well for context and whether its categories apply well 
to individual cases. He concluded that, rather than symptoms 
being signs or indices, they should be conceived as personal 
constructions.
The next section of the article examines recent literature 
related to topics in mental disorder. They include work on net-
work models and the construct approach at issue in the article, 
preparing the way for the hybrid model developed over the two 
approaches. In brief, the articles cited have helped lead to the 
present top-down (construct)/bottom-up (symptom network) 
causal model relating symptom and mental disorder. In addition, 
the review provides comments that prepare elaboration of the 
present model.
LiteratUre reVieW
The literature review concentrates on the disorders of posttrau-
matic stress and depression, in particular. It especially analyzes 
the research by McNally et al. (2) for the former, and Wigman 
et al. (14) for the latter.
posttraumatic stress disorder
Dimensions
In a literature review and conceptual analysis, Rosen and 
Lilienfeld (30) evaluated the core assumptions of PTSD. They 
found that research findings provided no compelling or consist-
ent support for its core assumptions. They queried whether it is 
a diagnostic category that should be kept in the DSM. In a later 
publication, Rosen and colleagues called for a process of active 
questioning to determine its validity (31). That being said, the 
literature has consistently engaged in scientific investigation of 
PTSD and its validity. Previously, I noted that the DSM-5 field 
trials found it to be reliable. In the following, I examine one aspect 
of its validity – concerning its symptom structure. The review will 
show that, rather than the current four-cluster model for PTSD in 
the DSM-5, models with more factors better fit the 20-symptom 
symptom list for PTSD as found in the DSM-5. In particular, a 
seven-factor model has been found to be the most powerful and, 
moreover, it has been found to have associations indicative of its 
clinical and theoretical value (32, 33).
Table  1 indicates the basic symptoms of PTSD both in the 
psychiatric diagnostic (nosological) manual, the DSM-IV 
[Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth 
Edition; (34)] and the DSM-5, and how the symptoms of PTSD 
November 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1646
Young Causality in Psychiatry
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org
are organized into clusters in these manuals. Moreover, the factor 
analytic research on how the symptoms cluster have not supported 
the way the DSMs have parsed the PTSD symptoms into clusters. 
In this regard, as mentioned, the most recent research of PTSD 
symptom clustering has indicated that a seven-factor model 
fits best how the 20 symptoms of PTSD in the DSM-5 organize 
into clusters [Ref. (32); and replicated by Wang et  al. (35); as 
summarized in Ref. (36)]. Furthermore, the research supports a 
dissociative PTSD subtype. In this regard, I have argued that there 
are really eight dimensions to consider in PTSD as described in 
the DSM-5 (36). Finally, the tables show my approach to which 
are core symptoms rather than non-core ones among the PTSD 
symptoms in each of the eight clusters involved in PTSD and the 
dissociative subtype in the DSM-5 (36).
The factor analytic research on PTSD uses confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA), which is based on a priori models that are tested. 
Until recently, only four-factor models had been supported, but 
the work of Elhai et al. (40) had shown that there might be five 
factors involved in PTSD, and more recently two six-factor mod-
els were tested and supported (32, 41) before they were combined 
in the seven-factor model. Therefore, the understanding of PTSD 
is becoming more refined and each cluster found represents 
some psychological construct related to it (e.g., re-experiencing, 
avoidance, hyperarousal/reactivity). This research is valuable for 
differentiating models of PTSD at the level of the higher-order 
constructs that comprise it, because working with 17 to 20 symp-
toms or so is quite difficult clinically. This is one reason why I 
tried to isolate the core symptoms in each of the clusters involved.
Zelazny and Simms (42) conducted CFA in a study of psy-
chiatric outpatients assessed using DSM-5 symptom criteria of 
PTSD. For both samples studied (those meeting either criteria 
in interview or a subthreshold stressor), the best fit of the data 
involved the above-mentioned seven-factor model. However, 
a new six-factor model also fit well the data (named alternate 
dysphoria, in which difficult concentrating and sleep problems 
are removed from the dysphoric arousal factor in these models 
and placed in the dysphoria factor).
Clearly, the research continues on the factor structure of 
PTSD. That being said, the lack of final response to the question 
cannot be taken to invalidate PTSD.
Networks
Partly in reaction to the complexity of working with long lists of 
symptoms, researchers using the symptom network approach to 
PTSD are attempting to discern how symptoms coordinate into 
nodes and their relations, referred to as edges. Also, they seek 
the centrality of symptoms in networks, such as in measures of 
betweenness. The approach statistically is quite different than 
that of CFA, which focuses on underlying constructs. In network 
approaches, the nodes and edges are the foci, and symptom 
themselves in their networking create and influence each other 
outside of any putative underlying construct.
In the network approach, symptoms covary, or couple variably, 
and affect each other through feedback loops, homeostatic rela-
tions, and so on, allowing sensitivity to individual differences in 
symptom expression and their causality. For example, an episode 
of PTSD would follow a course related to symptom nodes in the 
network “turning on” and “transmitting their activation” to nodes 
connected to them.
McNally et  al. (2) presented a network approach to the 
symptoms of PTSD. They conducted a questionnaire study of 
taBLe 1 | dsM-5 ptsd symptom cluster model (seven) and the 
dissociative subtype (one), with hypothesized core/non-core symptoms 
specified.
number symptom Cluster non-core Core
ptsd
1 Memories (intrusive) Re-experiencing – ✓
2 Nightmares (recurrent) Re-experiencing ✓ –
3 Dissociative reactions/
flashbacks
Re-experiencing ✓ –
4 Emotional reactivity 
(heightened; to signals)
Re-experiencing ✓ –
5 Physiological reactivity 
to reminders (marked)
Re-experiencing ✓ –
6 Avoid thoughts/feelings/
memories (reminders)
Avoidance ✓ –
7 Avoid external reminders Avoidance – ✓
8 Amnesia: inability to 
recall important aspects 
Negative affect ✓ –
9 Negative beliefs 
(persistent, heightened)
Negative affect ✓ –
10 Self/other blame 
(persistent)
Negative affect ✓ –
11 Negative emotional 
state (persistent)
Negative affect – ✓
12 Loss of interest (marked) Anhedonia ✓ –
13 Detachment Anhedonia – ✓
14 Restricted positive affect Anhedonia ✓ –
15 Irritability/anger Externalizing behavior – ✓
16 Reckless/
self-destructive
Externalizing behavior ✓ –
17 Hypervigilance Alterations in arousal 
and reactivity
✓ –
18 Startle (exaggerated) Alterations in arousal 
and reactivity
– ✓
19 Difficulty concentrating Dysphoric arousal ✓ –
20 Sleep disturbance Dysphoric arousal – ✓
dissociative subtype
1 Depersonalization Dissociation – ✓
2 Derealization Dissociation ✓ –
The table indicates the 20 symptoms in the DSM-5 [Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition; (1)], and the 17 in the DSM-IV [Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition; (34)]. There have been changes 
in wording for some of the symptoms from one version to the next, and the abbreviated 
versions in the table refer to the DSM-5 symptom list. One of the symptoms in the 
table (sense of foreshortened future) applies only to the DSM-IV. The table also gives 
the arrangement of the symptoms into clusters in the DSM-5 and in the DSM-IV. 
There are four clusters for the former and three for the latter. The DSM-5 clusters 
essentially involve splitting the DSM-IV avoidance/numbing cluster, consistent with the 
factor analytic model on the DSM-IV factor structure (37). There are other competing 
models. Moreover, other research (38) points to a separate cluster related to the DSM’s 
dissociative subtype. The table indicates which of the symptoms for each of the eight 
clusters in the table appear to be predominant, essential, or core (39).
Adapted from Young (36).
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survivors of a 2008 Chinese earthquake, with over 360 respond-
ents. They used a translated version of the PCL [Posttraumatic 
Checklist – Civilian; (43); Mandarin Chinese version; (44)]. The 
questionnaire is keyed to the DSM-IV. According to the question-
naire, 38% met the criteria for probable PTSD (5 years after the 
earthquake when the data were gathered).
The data showed that with exclusion of results at r ≤  0.30, 
strong associations become more evident, for example, for hyper-
vigilance and startle and also avoidance of thoughts and activities 
(about the trauma and associated with it, respectively). Numbing 
and dissociation symptoms were strongly linked (loss of interest 
in enjoyable activities; feeling distance from others, respectively). 
Finally, nightmares, flashbacks, and intrusive memories related 
to the trauma were tightly linked. The authors noted that these 
various symptom linkages appear related to the three DSM-IV 
symptom clusters of hyperarousal, avoidance/numbing, and re-
experiencing, respectively. However, other symptom linkages did 
not conform to these DSM clusters – those of startle-concentration 
problems, and anger-concentration problems.
Other results included that concentration networking indi-
cated that two re-experiencing symptoms were not connected to 
the others (physiological reactivity, feeling upset at reminders), 
but quite connected to each other. Centrality calculations showed 
that a highly central symptom concerns perceiving the future 
as foreshortened. Overall, the authors concluded that hyper-
vigilance, future foreshortening, and sleep appear predominant 
symptoms in PTSD symptom network analysis, with multiple 
symptom linkages involved, including some not previously 
considered.
To conclude this section of the paper, I note that in Young 
et al. (45), I attempted to show how a network model of PTSD 
symptoms could distinguish primary (core), secondary, and 
tertiary ones. That work indicates that network thinking can be 
applied to mental disorder in multiple ways.
depression and other disorders
Bielczyk et al. (15) adopted a similar model for major depressive 
disorder. According to them, causal relations in network dynam-
ics are the cause of clinical constructs such as depression.
Bielczyk et  al. (15) added a role in depression of attractor 
dynamics and also for the regulation of excitation–inhibition 
balance across brain circuits. These latter concepts are quite 
consistent with my own (6), in that I argue that NLDST can help 
explain shifts to health and illness attractors and that activation/
inhibition coordination is an important mechanism at all levels 
in brain–behavior relations.
Conway and Kovacs (46) have shown how the field of 
human intelligence is moving away from the traditional latent 
psychological construct model (g, general factor of intelligence) 
in which g is considered a causal general ability, to new models 
that interpret g as an emergent property reflecting the positive 
correlations found among test scores. This research shows how 
the concept that underlying constructs need to be complemented 
if not replaced by other models is gaining traction in areas other 
than psychopathology.
These newer models are “formative” ones, and not the 
traditional “reflective,” essentialist, or “entity realism” ones. In 
formative models, there still are psychological constructs, but as 
causal effects or consequences rather than causal initiators.
Conway and Kovacs (46) concluded that hybrid models of 
intelligence exist, and they are partly reflective in nature and 
partly formative, too, such as found in their own “process overlap” 
theory. As has been emphasized, for the topic of psychopathology, 
the present work also is proposing a hybrid reflective (top-down) 
and formative (bottom-up) causal model of the relationship 
between symptom and illness. The model that I have created 
derives from the seminal work of McNally et al. (2) and also that 
of Wigman et al. (14), presented next.
Wigman et  al. (14) examined data gathered by experience 
sampling methodology (ESM) in a pooled sample (N = 599) of 
three groups (depression in past; current status mild; psychotic 
symptoms, with disorder diagnosed; controls). Participants were 
given wristwatches that beeped quasi-randomly 10 times per day 
over a period of 5 to 6 days (depending on the particular sample). 
The signal required them to fill in a self-assessment diary. The 
focus of their study was to analyze the relations of participants’ 
responses, as given on a 7-point Likert scale, for five items, which 
were – at this moment, I feel: cheerful; content; insecure; down; 
suspicious.
Wigman et al. (14) reviewed the top-down psychological con-
struct approach to mental disorder. As shown, in this approach, 
mental symptoms are viewed as being caused by underlying con-
structs. In contrast, the bottom-up approach that they reviewed 
maintains that psychopathology involves a complex interacting 
network of components. At the symptom level, this approach 
views mental states as nodes that, when activated, might trigger 
other mental states (47). Symptom networks might be non-linear 
in their mutual effects, reciprocal, with feedback loops, vicious 
circles, and increased connectivity.
Despite pointing out the major differences in the two models of 
how symptoms and disorder might relate, Wigman et al. (14) did 
not contrast in a direct fashion one model vs. the other. Rather, 
they compared mental state network structure over groups hav-
ing the different diagnoses mentioned to healthy controls. Also, 
they sought clusters of network components across network data. 
Note that the network characteristics analyzed involved centrality 
indices: node strength, outward degree, inward degree, closeness, 
and betweenness.
Perhaps because the first type of analysis undertaken involved 
group comparison and the second transdiagnostic analysis, the 
authors referred to the cross-group network analysis as top-down 
even though it makes more sense to refer to network analysis 
as bottom-up and they referred to the principle component 
analysis as bottom-up even though it typically would be referred 
to as top-down compared to network analysis. In short, I query 
whether their approach by Wigman et  al. (14) allows for the 
hybrid reflective–formative conceptualization of mental disorder 
and their relations to symptoms. It seems that all they did was 
analyze the data involved with the two types of statistics typically 
associated with one approach or the other, but not in the way that 
the statistics are typically used in this type of research. Careful 
analysis of their results in what follows confirms this impression.
The results in Wigman et  al. (14) showed that having a 
diagnosis led to more strongly connected moment-to-moment 
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mental state network structures, and more so for depression 
relative to psychosis. For example, in depressed patients, there 
were many more interconnections between negative and positive 
emotions, unlike the case for the group with psychosis, for which 
connections like this were rare. In the latter group, there appears 
to be two separate loops of mental state, one negative and the 
other positive. In terms of the connectedness measurement, it 
was higher in the group with depression, e.g., in terms of node 
strength and inward and outward degree. Depressed individuals 
had the highest node strength. Finally, the comparison group 
had the least connections going to or coming from negative 
mental states.
As for the principal component analysis results, seven high-
order components emerged. They were based on loadings over 
associations such as mental state at time t − 1 and what follows at 
time t. For the first factor, all the loaded associations began with 
a positive emotional state at time t − 1. Therefore, the authors 
interpreted it “impact of positive mental state.” The second factor 
seemed to reflect the negative impact of feeling down on other 
mental states, and so on. A primary result was that compared to 
the controls, the two psychiatrically disordered groups obtained 
higher scores on the component of “impact of insecure,” suggest-
ing that this component might be a general one in mental illness 
in multiple dimensions of psychopathology. The authors noted 
that the network paradigm appears to be a useful one in mapping 
transdiagnostic processes in mental state.
Wigman et al. (14) concluded that individuals with the same 
diagnosis might exhibit substantially different symptom patterns. 
Moreover, the concept itself of separate diagnoses might be prob-
lematic in that psychopathology might reflect one underlying 
explanatory principle  –  that of mental state interconnectivity 
underlying symptoms. These conclusions are quite accurate, 
but they might reflect the manner in which the analyses were 
conducted rather than anything like a genuinely hybrid model 
of reflective and formative models. In such an approach, psycho-
logical construct and network analyses would be conceptualized 
as equal and interacting reciprocal causality mechanisms of the 
relationship of symptom and psychological construct, and not be 
considered hybrid simply because a principal component analysis 
was applied to network data. In the following, I attempt to create 
such an integrative model of symptom–mental disorder relations. 
In the latter approach, only the data analysis methods are hybrid, 
not the conceptualization.
This penultimate section of the article follows next and out-
lines a genuine hybrid model of symptom–mental disorder rela-
tions from a bottom-up–top-down perspective. Once the model 
building is complete, the article considers further the nature of 
symptoms, for example, in terms of the value of perceiving them 
as individualized mental content and meaning.
tHe HyBrid syMptoM–MentaL 
disorder ModeL
Specifically for this section of the article, I re-introduce the bot-
tom-up and top-down models of the symptom–mental disorder 
relationship. Then, I show how the two models can reciprocally 
interrelate.
Modeling
In models of symptoms and mental disorder relations, one set of 
models concerns higher-order (latent variable) constructs (e.g., 
PTSD) that cause or influence in a top-down manner the lower-
order manifest symptoms and their clusters (which in turn might 
be an intermediate level of influence on symptoms). In contrast, 
according to network models, cluster/symptom interactions 
cause their pattern of expressions and the term associated with 
mental disorder (e.g., PTSD) is a representation of the symptoms 
and their interactions rather than being a causal influence on 
their manifestation.
One way of accommodating the different views on psychopa-
thology of what constitutes bottom-up and top-down processes 
is to consider a systems model with different levels (see Figure 1). 
Systems thinking is best exemplified by NLDST [e.g., Ref. (3, 16)], 
in which different levels of a system might interact and even be 
created in the interaction, just as different elements in any one 
level of the system (or of the system as a whole) might interact 
and even create new elements. Moreover, changes in system state 
might take place because of minor perturbations when the system 
is at far-from-equilibrium, while living systems generally might 
be poised at this state preparatory to change because of its adap-
tive value.
Figure 1 illustrates the difference between a hybrid conceptual-
ization of symptom–mental state relations and a hybrid statistical 
analysis of the relations. There is no reason why it cannot be the 
case that with each of the classic top-down, psychological con-
struct approach and the bottom-up, symptom-driven approach, 
there are both network and cluster statistics that could be used.
Although powerful, the network approach to symptom cau-
sality and connection is more descriptive than mechanistic. It 
might indicate that symptoms connect and even in unique ways 
compared to conjectures and findings based on other approaches. 
However, the causes of the connectivities involved are not speci-
fied except by indicating that the symptom interactions are the 
cause. This might represent tautology, although I am sympathetic 
to the lower-order, grounded, and micromoment dynamics 
producing the connectivities. We need to know which symptoms 
emerge as predominant in any one moment of time, and the 
work of Wigman et al. (14) provides methods for tackling this 
issue. Moreover, they also refer to dynamic temporal processes in 
network expression.
Nevertheless, at another level, systems theory could tell us 
more about emerging connectivities over symptoms and their 
relations to mental state. In this regard, the work of Bielczyk et al. 
(15) indicates that mechanisms that might cohere symptoms 
(or repel them) might act through dynamical system processes 
[including activation/inhibition balancing, which is a concept 
central in my work: (3, 6)]. Symptom system dynamics can be 
measured in different ways in dynamical systems approaches 
compared to network ones, for example, in terms of control and 
order parameters and of exponents related to bifurcation points 
in which systems split into new attractor regimes or chaotic–
antichaotic adaptive systems, fractal patterns, and so on.
That being said, the micromoment approach to symptom 
connectivity at times t −  1, t, t +  1, etc., could inform these 
analyses in complementary ways. For example, patients might 
General Higher-Order Behavior/ Psychopathology 
(transdiagnostic, common)
Specific Domains/ Disorder(s) (or Dimensions, 
depending on view of validity of separate 
disorders)
Mental States (these might involve 
bottom-up related statistics, e.g., 
network/ centrality analysis)
Moment-to-Moment Behaviors/ Symptoms 
(Positive, Negative)
Network analysis (these might involve 
top-down related statistics, e.g., 
principle component analysis)
Centrality, as an example (e.g., node strength, 
inward degree, outward degree, closeness, 
betweenness)
Clusters (aggregates, without imputing underlying 
construct)
Emergent 
Top-Down 
Levels
Reductionist 
Bottom-Up 
Levels
FiGUre 1 | top-down and bottom-up levels in behavior/symptom 
normality/psychopathology. The figure illustrates the complementarity of 
top-down and bottom-up models of the causal relationship between 
symptoms and mental disorder. In systems, different levels might exist with 
higher-order levels emergent or distinct in characteristics from lower-order 
ones on which they are built. In terms of the constituents of the levels, they 
might be single elements, patterns, or networks, or even superordinate 
structures. Statistical techniques, such as network analysis or principle 
component analysis, can be applied to both emergent, higher-order levels 
and more basic ones. In terms of psychological constructs, at the 
higher-order emergent levels, in psychopathology, they might be specific 
disorders, dimensions, or overarching constructs (e.g., internalizing/
externalizing disorders).
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have a more powerful symptom at any one time among their suite 
of symptoms, or one symptom might lead the way at any one 
moment in bringing a subthreshold one to disorder (and perhaps 
disability). As yet, there is no clear integrative model of how any 
one symptom might become primary in these senses at any one 
moment, although, as shown, the work of Wichers et al. (27) has 
made strides in these regards.
The symptom complex of the patient is crucial, as are symptom 
linkages over individualized patterns, or the network of nodes/
edges (relations) expressed by the patient over time. Based on 
this approach, the clinician might develop individual mappings 
of the dynamic evolution of symptoms over sessions and apply 
individualized approaches to intervention and treatment.
To conclude this portion of the article, hybrid conceptualiza-
tions to date on the relationship of symptoms and disorder have 
much to offer, but there might be conceptual limitations in the 
work that bar further progress. In this regard, current hybrid 
models [e.g., Ref. (14)], as argued above, might not allow for 
genuine reciprocity between the causal effects of the higher-order 
construct and the lower-order symptoms. Only by avoiding to 
equate any statistical modeling with conceptual ones and also by 
finding a common conceptual umbrella for both types of models 
can a genuine hybrid one over them be constructed. The next 
section presents a systems model-informed hybrid model of 
symptom–mental disorder relations based on these premises.
the Model
Figures 2 and 3 present core material of the present model of how 
symptoms and mental disorder interrelate in a hybrid fashion. The 
second of these two figures specifies how the concept of emergent 
circular causality (3) can be applied equally to the bottom-up and 
top-down approaches to causality. Specifically, Figures 2 and 3 
depict the difference between the latent variable/psychological 
construct model of the relationship between PTSD and its clus-
ters/symptoms and the symptom-interactive or network model.
In considering development of a genuine hybrid model 
over the construct and symptom network approaches to how 
symptoms and mental disorder relates such that construct and 
symptoms causally interact, primacy should not be given to 
either component. Moreover, the statistical models that one 
might choose to work within each paradigm constrain the model 
building involved.
The next section of the article specifically demonstrates how 
a more integrative model of the reflective construct and forma-
tive network models could be constructed for the question of 
 symptom–mental disorder relationship. It avoids some of the 
pitfalls of prior attempts to do the same. Nevertheless, it is an 
initial conceptualization that itself has limitations, such as not yet 
being mathematically grounded nor empirically tested.
Figures 4 and 5 present a genuine hybrid reflective and forma-
tive model of causality over mental symptom and disorder. For 
any one construct or cluster, there is not only influence/creation 
downward to symptoms but also feedback upward from symptom 
interactions to construct/cluster. Moreover, these top-down and 
bottom-up models function at multiple intermediary levels 
(intermediate, superordinate) and the interactions can take place 
not only horizontally (among symptoms; among levels/sublevels; 
and their configurations/patterns) but also vertically (downward 
or upward over (sub) levels).
Therefore, causality does not reside in one nexus node, level, 
element, element (sub)set, construct, or multiple aspects of 
these constituents of the symptom and disorder but in all the 
rich dynamical systemic interactions and reciprocal influences 
among them. Symptoms have causal effects on each other but 
constructs have causal effects on them. Constructs, such as men-
tal disorder, are not ephemeral, reducible entities to symptoms, 
but emergent, irreducible entities that can affect and even initiate 
the symptoms. They reflect dynamical system characteristics, 
and can take on a life of their own at higher-order levels of a 
system. Perhaps they are not directly observable, but their role 
A      Across Clusters
B      Within Clusters
(S3)
(S5)
(S4)
S1
S2
(C8) C1
C2
C3
(C4)(C5)
(C6)
(C7)
FiGUre 3 | a symptom-interactive (bottom-up) causal model of ptsd 
symptoms (s) and clusters (C). (a) Across clusters, (B) within clusters. In 
“non-essentialist” system-interactive or behavior/symptom network, 
connective models, behaviors/symptoms interact amongst themselves and 
constitute the cause of the pattern of behaviors/symptoms expressed. For 
example, if sleep is poor, other symptoms might be exacerbated. Individual 
differences in behavior/symptom expression derive from the behavior/
symptom interactions in context (and over time/development). There is no 
higher-order “essential” (latent) psychological variable, construct, entity, trait, 
characteristic, or attribute that influences the behavior/symptom interactions. 
If terms relating to these levels of behavior are used in this model, it is only to 
represent the interactions and not as a factor that causes or influences them. 
In this regard, behaviors/symptoms in interaction do so at a level that is 
bottom-up rather than top-down.
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can be inferred and the mechanisms that being them about are 
increasingly understood.
In short, emergence is a common construct in systems theory, 
but in my approach to it, circular causality constitutes an impor-
tant driving mechanism in emergence (48). That is, as system 
levels interact with one another, new ones can emerge at higher 
orders, and they can become overarching and overriding drivers 
of behavior and symptom expression (3, 6). Specifically, I had 
written in Young (3) that in “circular emergence” different levels 
of systems can form and integrate, with higher-order ones gaining 
degrees of freedom through their flexibility even as their degrees 
of freedom are constrained through the intercoordinations 
involved. Also, I noted that activation/inhibition coordination 
can serve as the critical mechanism in stabilizing systems, in 
keeping them at the cusp of change, and in recreating equilibrium 
after they change.
ConCLUsion
First, the article has provided background information, such as 
relevant definitions and issues related to nosology, causality, and 
network and construct models of symptom–disorder relations. 
Then, it reviewed the relevant literature in the field, tackling alter-
native models and trying to disambiguate them. Next, it gave a 
genuinely hybrid model for the relationship of symptom network 
and psychological constructs in mental disorder.
PTSD
(C4)
C1
C3
(C6)
(C8)
C2
(C5)
(C7)
Across Clusters
Within Clusters
A
B
Cluster
(S4)
S1
S3
(S6)
(S8)
S2
(S5)
(S7)
FiGUre 2 | a latent variable construct (top-down) causal model of 
ptsd symptoms (s) and clusters (C). (a) Across clusters, (B) within 
clusters. In latent variable or construct models of psychological phenomena, 
an “essential” underlying psychological entity, trait, characteristic, or 
superordinate attribute is considered as a valid higher-order behavioral reality 
that is not caused by or conditioned by the lower-order behaviors/symptoms 
associated with it but, to the contrary, conditions or causes in a top-down 
manner how they are manifested (in context, over time/development). Mental 
disorders might have several clusters and each can be characterized as a 
quasi-dependent sub-disorder that conditions/causes its associated 
symptoms. In this model, individual differences derive from the overarching 
construct involved and not from the manifested symptoms themselves, which 
merely reflect, in their patterns, the higher-order individual differences 
involved.
PTSD Cluster 2(Cluster 4)
Cluster 3
Cluster 1*(S4)
S2 S2
S2
S2
S1*
(S3)
(S4)
(S4)
(S4)
(S3) (S3)
(S3)
S1*S1*
S1*
FiGUre 4 | integrative causal symptom-construct model in mental disorder. The figure depicts the relationship between symptoms and mental disorder (or 
a symptom cluster of one) as dynamically reciprocal in causation. The mental disorder constitutes an underlying, higher-order level in the patient’s mental state 
symptoms, while the symptoms interact at lower levels of the system, with both the top-down and bottom-up influences dynamically influencing each other in 
context and over time. Note: the parentheses indicate that PTSD might have only three clusters (as in the DSM-IV), and a cluster might have only two symptoms. Of 
course, depending on the disorder involved either might have more items (i.e., clusters or symptoms, respectively). Of the clusters in any mental disorder, for their 
symptoms, it would be beneficial to specify which ones are core/primary. For the model presented in the figure, these could be the first clusters or symptoms that 
are specified by the asterisks.
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To conclude the article, in the next section, I return to con-
sidering the nature of symptoms by querying their unconscious, 
subjective, descriptive, and meaning side compared to their 
conscious, objective, and reductionist universal causal side. I 
present a novel model that addresses the question in an integrated 
manner.
One could ask even whether overarching illness entities could 
impact symptoms, and that mental disorders could be reducible 
to symptoms sets, as in the DSM-5. One answer to this conun-
drum would be to abandon the DSM-5 because of its multiple 
critics [see Ref. (7, 49)]. For them, the DSM-5 has theoretical, 
epistemological, and social weaknesses; was the result of a cha-
otic revision process; does not consider sufficiently the causality 
related to the listed mental disorders; they are artificial; and so on. 
However, continued research and revision of its categories could 
be improving its clinical usage.
Psychiatry needs to address critical questions on the nature 
of symptoms and mental disorder but, at the same time, bal-
ance scienticism and skepticism, or create hybrid models that 
integrate them and go beyond them. We need pause for thought 
Emergent Bottom-Up Circular Causality
Superordinate level 
(constructed from lower-order levels/ sublevels; distinct from them)
Emergent new levels 
(constructed from system elements; distinct from them; also, their 
interactions might create new lower-order levels/ sublevels)
System elements 
(e.g., symptoms; also, their interaction influences/ creates their 
elements)
Emergent Top-Down Circular CausalityB
Superordinate level 
(influences/ creates lower (sub)levels/ elements)
Lower-order levels/ sublevels 
(influence/ create their elements)
System elements in each level/ sublevel
(as elements change, potential for bottom-up emergent circular 
causality begins a new)
A
FiGUre 5 | the interaction of top-down and bottom-up emergent 
circular causality. (a) Emergent bottom-up circular causality, (B) emergent 
top-down circular causality. 
Note: (1) Configuration/pattern changes possible, too, within and between 
(sub)levels. (2) Bottom-up and top-down causal processes work together 
reciprocally in system causality. 
The figure illustrates the dynamic interaction of bottom-up and top-down 
processes both within and across levels in a system, including the possibility 
of emergence of new symptoms, levels, and sublevels. It also indicates the 
change of patterning or configuration possible within and between levels in 
the system dynamics involved. Briefly, as system elements (e.g., symptoms) 
or levels/sublevels interact, they might influence/create their configuration/
patterning, expression, or even de novo emergence. This process may occur 
both through movement from lower to higher levels in the level hierarchy 
involved (bottom-up), or from higher to lower levels (top-down), or reciprocally 
in both ways. In essence, the figure clarifies that, in system function, 
bottom-up processes work both within and between levels, as do top-down 
processes.
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in evaluating the relative roles of hermeneutic insight and causal 
explanation in psychiatry (Verstehen, Erklären, respectively). 
Whether we accept that symptom meaning/content, or phenom-
enology can be influenced by hermeneutic insight, “Verstehen” 
has important consequences. Are symptoms and their meaning/
content only what can be observed, and therefore, reduced to what 
is measurable, or are there other levels to consider? In this regard, 
symptom meaning or content might be a higher-order level in the 
symptom/disorder complex, whether the symptoms are observed 
or self-reported. Moreover, observed and self-reported symptoms 
could be tapping different patient realities, and what might these 
differences mean for symptom meaning/content? For cause, 
are reductionist, biological views used to explain symptoms/
disorders rather than higher-order mental content or constructs? 
Can the latter causally influence lower-order (and more easily 
observed/self-reported) symptoms (Erklären)?
Figure  6 presents a model of symptom expressions that 
illustrates the difficulty in addressing these types of questions, 
while proposing a nuanced solution. On the one hand, symptom 
meaning and causality do not necessarily stand in opposition. For 
example, at the level of individualization and universalization, 
symptoms could be unique to the person’s history and current 
mental content, as well as unique in the coalition of forces that 
had created them. As well, symptoms could reflect universal 
themes and concerns, and also reflect standard common causal 
mechanisms.
Ultimately, both individual and universal mental content and 
symptoms might not be what they appear, either to the person 
expressing them phenomenologically and subjectively or to 
the observer using empirical methods, e.g., in observations, 
interviews, self-report questionnaires, in discerning them. Both 
subjective and objective understanding of symptoms might 
approach their reality.
Certainly, a complicating factor in all these regards relates 
to the play of unconscious processes in symptom creation and 
expression. This could apply in the sense of (a) classic Freudian 
repression, (b) automaticity in thought without deliberative 
reflection or insight, or (c) a lack of awareness of the overall 
system in which the symptoms are embedded.
Specifically for the area of PTSD and some other related con-
ditions/disorders that are subject to legal dispute (e.g., chronic 
pain/somatic symptom disorder), the answers to these types of 
questions are complicated by court considerations. One needs to 
veer toward the more objective side as much as possible in order 
to vet possible confounds, such as malingering and unconscious 
influences on clinical presentation and self-report. Figure 6 illus-
trates that intention is very difficult to evaluate and can never be 
evaluated uniquely by test results or clinical interview. Young (13, 
36, 39, 50, 51) has presented work relevant to the question, calling 
for a scientifically-informed comprehensive impartial approach 
to assessment in these types of cases.
Ultimately, the network approach to symptom and mental 
disorder relationship addresses some of the issues raised about 
individual insight vs. universal explanation in symptomatology 
because, in this view, how symptoms interact becomes the seat 
of causal explanation and understanding. Nevertheless, in my 
hybrid model, one needs to consider top-down psychological 
construct influences on symptoms as much as their bottom-up 
interactions, so that their meaning and causation lay in not only 
symptom networking processes but also in higher-order levels 
in the symptom structure and the causes associated with them.
Often issues in our field are presented as a dichotomy, or in 
black and white. For example, for the causes of behavior, too 
often they are phrased as Nature vs. Nurture. Yet, behavioral 
causation reflects an interaction of biological, personal (e.g., self, 
free will belief), and environmental factors (6). Similarly, for the 
issue of scientism vs. skepticism and how it relates to considering 
symptoms in terms of individualized meanings or universal (read 
reductionist) causal mechanisms (Verstehen, Erklären, respec-
tively), the opposition is presented too simply. The question of 
whether the nature of symptoms are either more unconscious, 
subjective/phenomenological, and meaningful in content or more 
conscious, observable, objective, and expressions of universal 
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FiGUre 6 | the dimensions of symptom expression in psychiatry. The figure places symptoms along three dimensions that concern: motivation/effort (are 
symptoms valid?); subjectivity/objectivity (e.g., phenomenological, empirical); and individuality/universality. (a) Symptoms might not be valid, or they could be ones 
that should not be taken at face value. For example, about the former, there might be conscious malingering for secondary gain that is taking place. About the latter, 
there might be unconscious influences at work; for example, an unconscious cry for help could take place or a conscious desperation cry. (b) Also, symptoms vary 
in terms of they are ascertained subjectively or objectively. For example, they might derive from the person’s self-report, in particular, or from the evaluator’s more 
controlled efforts to observe/discern them. (c) Finally, symptoms vary in their individuality/universality. At one extreme, each symptom has a personal meaning or 
value for the patient/client that is unique to her/his history/narrative/experience. Or the causes of the symptoms constitute a unique constellation. On the other hand, 
they might indicate some cultural universal or meme/mythic narrative. In addition, they might reflect a universal causal or mechanism in behavior to which we are all 
subject and in constant, invariant ways.
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causality might be one that masks a greater underlying complexity 
in understanding them, such as in the  three-dimensional model 
presented in the figure.
In the article, I have presented an integrated top-down (psy-
chological construct)/bottom-up (symptom network interaction) 
model of the relationship between symptom and disorder. The 
same model can be applied to understanding the relationship 
between mental content and their causes. Because of the multiple 
levels in systems of behavior, emergent contents can develop at 
higher-order levels that are not totally reflective of, reducible to, or 
transcribable from the lower levels, including of the causes involved. 
Mental contents, such as beliefs, emotions, and desires, can emerge 
and influence symptoms that might be closer to the lower-order 
biological or physical substrate, including neurobehaviorally, 
because of the process of circular emergence and the creation of 
higher-order levels in behavioral systems that the process allows.
In this regard, one example of higher-order mental state influ-
ences on lower-order symptoms is found in the how catastrophic 
and hopeless thought and related cognitive and emotional 
processes could cause downward spirals in helplessness and 
amotivation, and then in the specific symptoms of disorders, 
such as depression or PTSD. In another example, the personally-
exaggerated appraisal of stress that then leads to stress-induced 
headaches is all too real for many of our patients.
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Symptoms and mental disorder co-exist in a system in which 
all relevant levels need to be recognized and researched. There 
should be no room for exclusive reductionist or construction-
ist approaches in understanding them, as both are needed. 
Reductionism and the search for cause in the most basic biologi-
cal processes should not be equated with scientism. Nor should 
seeking emergent phenomena that could influence behavior be 
treated with skepticism. Behavioral, symptom, and mental con-
tent states exist coactively with their causes, and science should 
examine the relations among all these levels with the clarity that 
patients deserve.
The present article has presented, hopefully, refined thinking 
in the area of mental disorder. Further effort along these lines 
might examine a possible systems model of the definition of 
mental disorder, one that includes levels for – symptoms, clusters, 
higher-order mental content, mental disorder, and related con-
cepts such as disability. Similarly, treatment can be conceived 
systemically, e.g., in terms of cascades that might result from 
effective treatment shifting the patient into the region of health 
attractors [e.g., Ref. (27)]. Network concepts can be embedded 
in systems models and, therefore, the two types of models con-
ceptualized together, and even hybridly, can provide a powerful 
language for grasping the nature of symptoms, mental disorder, 
causality, and cure (or treatment).
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